Final AF 447 crash report reiterates speed sensor problems, pilots’ lack of understanding
By Aaron Karp | July 5, 2012
The French BEA's final report on the 2009 crash of Air France (AF) Flight 447, released Thursday, reiterated the two main themes of its investigation over the past three years: the Airbus A330-200’s malfunctioning pitot probes provided inconsistent speed measurements and the pilots did not understand the rapidly deteriorating situation, failing to properly identify a stall situation or react promptly to it (ATW Daily News, Aug. 1, 2011).
By Aaron Karp | July 5, 2012
The French BEA's final report on the 2009 crash of Air France (AF) Flight 447, released Thursday, reiterated the two main themes of its investigation over the past three years: the Airbus A330-200’s malfunctioning pitot probes provided inconsistent speed measurements and the pilots did not understand the rapidly deteriorating situation, failing to properly identify a stall situation or react promptly to it (ATW Daily News, Aug. 1, 2011).
The pilots “had lost their understanding of the situation,” BEA director Jean-Paul Troadec told reporters Thursday. The A330 crashed while en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris Charles de Gaulle on June 1, 2009, killing all 228 passengers and crew. It took fewer than four minutes to fall from approximately 38,000 ft. into the waters of the Atlantic Ocean.
But the report does not rest blame entirely with the pilots. “Quite to the contrary, their report to me seemed quite balanced” and blamed faulty aircraft technology and the training the pilots received, John Clemes, a victim’s brother who was among those fully briefed on the report before the general public, told France 24 television. “They indicated a number of problems with the companies and manufacturers involved.”
AF noted in a statement that BEA “underlines a sequence and combination of several factors—technical and human—that led to the loss of the aircraft … The BEA report describes a crew who acted in line with the information provided by the cockpit instruments and systems, and the aircraft behavior as it was perceptible in the cockpit: instrument indications, triggering and stoppage of the alarms, aerodynamic noise, aircraft vibrations, etc. The reading of the various data did not enable them to apply the appropriate action.”
